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The Microsoft-Yahoo merger:
Yes, privacy is an antitrust concern
by Robert H. Lande 
      
   The same day that Microsoft announced it was about to offer $44.6 billion offer for Yahoo, Senator Herb 
Kohl (D-Wisc.), chairman of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee, issued a statement: “We will need to scru-
tinize the deal carefully to ensure that it will not cause any harm to the competitiveness of what has been a 
vibrant high tech marketplace, nor negatively impact the privacy rights of internet users.”
   Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission, in its Dec. 20, 2007 majority Statement analyzing but ultimately 
deciding not to challenge the Google/DoubleClick merger on antitrust grounds, noted: “We investigated the 
possibility that this transaction could adversely affect ... consumers’ privacy.  We have concluded that the evi-
dence does not support a conclusion that it would do so.” One Commissioner dissented, largely because she 
believed the transaction would be likely to detrimentally affect consumers’ privacy.
   Privacy and antitrust? Isn’t antitrust only supposed to be concerned with price – will prices rise as a result of 
a merger? 
   Well, no. Antitrust is actually about consumer choice, and price is only one type of choice. The ultimate pur-
pose of the antitrust laws is to help ensure that the free market will bring to consumers everything they want 
from competition. This starts with competitive prices, of course, but consumers also want an optimal level of 
variety, innovation, quality, and other forms of nonprice competition. Including privacy protection. 
   The antitrust laws have traditionally focused on price effects because the other dimensions of competition 
will usually follow naturally in markets that have effective price competition. 
   But not always. There are some key situations where non-price issues must be analyzed separately.
   For example, some cases involve markets where there is little or no price competition as a result of regu-
lation or third party insurance payers. If all the taxicab companies in a city are required to charge the same 
amount, then they have to compete on service and quality. If all the shops that might replace a driver’s broken 
windshield will be reimbursed by an insurance company, then the customer will choose on the basis of ser-
vice, convenience, or some other factor. In neither of these circumstances could a complete analysis look at 
price alone.  
   Some other cases involve markets where firms compete primarily through independent product development 
or creativity, rather than through price. This creative competition may involve things like high-tech innova-
tion, delivery of new patient-friendly hospital services, or editorial independence in the news media. Effective 
innovation may sometimes require more providers than are needed just to have price competition, since the 
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path of successful innovation may be impossible to 
identify beforehand, and multiple paths may have to be 
explored.
   Is privacy another situation where a price analysis 
alone would be incomplete?  
   There is no doubt that privacy is a significant, seri-
ous, and separate concern for a large number of people. 
Indeed, for many of us privacy is not something we are 
willing to trade away lightly, or at all, no matter how 
inexpensive the product or service we get in return. 
This can be an especially acute problem because con-
sumers might at times not be fully aware of the privacy 
ramifications of their online transactions.
   The consumer protection laws are the primary meth-
od society uses to protect privacy. But competition 
also plays a role. Businesses can and do vie with one 
another in promising to respect consumers’ privacy. In 
some areas, such as private banking, auction services, 
security services, or resorts catering to celebrities, the 
assurances of privacy are obviously some of the most 
important parts of the package. In other areas, such as 
the medical and legal fields, privacy is such an impor-
tant value and so ubiquitously desired that we take it 
for granted.
   When a market is competitive, any information-heavy 
firm that does not respect consumers’ privacy rights 
will pay a penalty. Consider the bad publicity that has 
resulted when companies have compromised thousands 
of consumers’ privacy by losing laptops that contained 
sensitive personal medical information. Consider the 
ramifications that could arise if a search engine seri-
ously ignored its own stated corporate privacy policy in 
ways that consumers cared about greatly. Or consider, 
hypothetically, the public anger that would greet the 
discovery that a search-engine company was selling 
potential insurers information about the medical condi-
tions that an individual has researched online.
   A monopoly probably could weather even the worst 
public relations storm, but a firm making a habit of 
huge privacy mistakes in a competitive market could 
soon go out of business as customers took their busi-
ness elsewhere. Knowledge of this helps to keep the 
firms careful.
   This means that a merger which significantly reduces 
the intensity of competition in any information-based 
market must be examined for its potential effects on all 
dimensions of competition – including privacy – rather 
than just for its price effects.    
   There is not enough publicly available information to 
assess whether the Microsoft/Yahoo merger will have a 
significant impact on users’ privacy. But Senator Kohl 
should be applauded for raising the privacy issue, and 
there is little doubt that the antitrust enforcers evaluat-
ing the merger also will analyze its privacy ramifica-
tions carefully.
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